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Neural Network Identification of Keystream Generators
LT James E. Heyman and Jeffery J. Leader
INTRODUCTION
There are many applications that require the generation of
pseudorandom bitstreams, that is, sequences of zeros and ones that
meet certain criteria. A partial list of these applications
includes coding, communications, spread spectrum techniques (both
for frequency allocation and security) , simulations, and security
access.
In addition to the typical measures of pseudorandomness,
applications dealing with communications security impose the
additional requirement that any attempt to retrieve the method of
generation should be extremely difficult. For these cases it is
useful to move beyond the scorecard of specific tests to a "larger"
definition of a suitable sequence as one in which no amount
knowledge of previous bits gives an indication as to what the next
bit will be.
At least philosophically, it should be clear that any
repeatable scheme that we as humans can come up with has to be
deterministic (i.e. nonrandom) and therefore, at some level,
predictable. It could be that the period is very large but that is
not the point. The point is that it is logically possible.
An immediate reaction to the fact that pseudorandom sequences
are being generated for security related applications is that it
seems like a good idea to develop methods to attack them.
Eventually the goal is to be able to accurately predict future bits
based on previous ones (assuming that through known plaintext or
some other method we are able to retrieve pure keystream) . Our
preliminary goal, however, is a bit more modest: To determine the
nature of the generator that was used to generate a particular
bitstream. Although modest this aim is far from trivial for while
there is much documentation concerning how to attack a sequence if
the type of generator is known there is no obvious way of deciding
which generator was used except by trial and error. As such, due
to the prevalence of shift registers, the standard strategy is to
attempt to simulate the sequence using Berlekamp-Massey (assuming
a reasonable linear complexity) and if that doesn't work then to
try something else. As more generation schemes appear this method
becomes rather tedious and inefficient. For our purposes we
restricted our investigation to three major generation methods:
Shift registers, a quadratic planar map, and the linear
congruent ial generator.
METHODOLOGY
Our proposed method of attack involves the use of a neural
net. Specifically, we used the BrainMaker neural net software
package to set up a back propagation model with fixed training and
testing parameters which was used to test a series of n bits to
predict one bit with n running from one to 25. It must be noted
that throughout the experiments all of parameters such as learning
rate, momentum, test rate, etc. were fixed. This was done to
demonstrate the viability of the scheme in general (as opposed to
finding specific solutions to specific coding problems) . For all
schemes bitstreams of length 1000 were used.
The basic idea is that for each family of generation schemes
this process results in a characteristic training and testing curve
that serves as a "fingerprint" of the process. The implication is
that given a bitstream from an unknown source this attack will
result in the determination of the family of generation schemes
from which it came.
SHIFT REGISTERS
The most common scheme for generating pseudorandom bitstreams
is the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) , the details of which
can be found in Golomb (1982) . For our immediate purposes all that
needs to be known is that an appropriately wired n-stage shift
register will generate a binary sequence of length 2 n-l. This
results in the favorable result that a fairly small shift register
with, for example, only 64 stages can produce a sequence that is
approximately 1.8 x 10 19 bits long. Intuitively it would seem that
such a sequence could baffle even the most powerful supercomputers
but it turns out that, by utilizing the Berlekamp-Massey or Zeigler
algorithm, a LFSR can be fully simulated if only 2n sequential bits
are known. (This is not a difficult program and can be completed
in 30 lines of MATLAB code.) Admittedly getting 2n bits of pure
keystream might pose a problem but it surely is much less a problem
than dealing with the entire sequence.
In as much as an effective algorithm exists for attacking
shift register generated bitstreams it is reasonable to expect that
any proposed new attack at least be able to match the efficacy of
the known algorithms.
The first example is a LFSR defined by the function f(x) =
x A 13 + x*12 + x A ll + x + 1. This function is primitive over GF(2)
and as such the resultant sequence will have a full period of 8191.
The following graph shows the result of applying the neural net in
the manner described above.
f(x) — x-13 + x~12 + x~11 + x + 1
As can be seen, the profile is similar to that of the linear
complexity in the sense that the pattern is quickly determined (at
n=13) and at that point any extra input bits are ignored. Of
particular interest is how both the training (solid) and testing
(dashed) lines remain relatively flat until the length of the shift
register is reached, at which point both spike up to perfect
training and testing. It is also noteworthy that once past that
point that it usually took around 50 data passes to complete the
training. Another facet is that it is possible to go back into the
net and isolate which input bits have a direct effect on the
output. The procedure is as follows: Label the bits as they
correspond to the stages of an n-long shift register. Then, one by
one, change the bits from zero to one (or one to zero as the case
may be) and observe whether a given bit flips the output. If it
does then the corresponding shift register stage of that bit has a
direct effect on the output. Upon checking all of the input bits
this results in the ability to recreate the polynomial associated
with the actual LFSR that was used.
We can thus conclude that even though we used more bits than
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm would require we were able to
generate the same results. More work needs to be done on the
effectiveness of this method as the total number of bits analyzed
is reduced in relation to the total length of the bitstream.
This experiment was then repeated on a LFSR based on the
function f (x) = x A 18 + x A 7 + 1 with the resulting curves displayed
below.
f(x) - x~18 + x~7 + 1
Note that the exact same fingerprint shows up. In conclusion,
we believe that this combination of a training curve that stays low
and flat combined with a testing curve that hovers around .5 until
both jump up to 100% is indicative of the use of a linear shift
register. In addition, by examining the net at the point of the
jump the actual function can be retrieved and thus the shift
register itself can be recovered.
QUADRATIC MAP
In previous work, Heyman (1993) , the possibility of using a
non-linear chaotic system to generate pseudorandom bitstreams was
investigated. The process basically consists of following an orbit
on the classic Henon (1976) attractor and assigning a zero or a one
based on whether the point was on the left cr right side of a
previously defined median point. Although there were some
anomalies concerning the "runs" property the overall conclusion was
that it did generate a reasonably pseudorandom sequence based on
the larger definition of predictability. Although bitstreams of
the same length as earlier (1000) were used these represent a
minuscule percentage of the total bitstream length since this
generation scheme has an approximate period of at least 10 15 when
generated on a personal computer. The following two graphs
summarize the results of the neural net attack on bitstreams


































Notice that both show a constant testing level of about 75%
while the training curve merges with the testing curve at n=15 and
then breaks out above at n=25. This same behavior was observed on
other Henon bitstreams.
Inasmuch as the Henon attractor is topologically conjugate to
a wide class of quadratic mappings of the real plane (all those
with constant Jacobian) , it is expected that future work which
applies this method of attack to other quadratic mappings will
generate similar results. As such, at this point we are confident
that this fingerprint is indicative of a bitstream which was
generated with the Henon scheme and we believe that a similar trace
will be generated by any other planar quadratic mapping (used to
generate a binary sequence as indicated in Heyman (1993)).
LINEAR CONGRUENTIAL
The next generation method used was based on the MATLAB random
number generator, with the standard conversion from (0,1) to {0,1}.
What makes the results surprising is that MATLAB uses a basic
linear congruential generator which generally is not considered
very sophisticated (although it is, of course, nonlinear; see
Gillespie (1992)). Be that as it may, and whatever its other
weaknesses are, as can be seen on the following graph, it does very
well on this test (in terms of unpredictability) . Nonetheless, it
does have a distinctive fingerprint and thus the generation method




























The distinguishing features of this fingerprint- are a testing
curve that hovers near 50% and a training curve that grows slowly
until the two curves intersect in the range of n equal to 20 to 25.
It is quite arguable, philosophically or physically, that
there are no macroscopic random processes. However, for most
purposes, it is acceptable to consider the flip of a coin as a
reasonably random event. For completeness, the neural net attack
was then attempted on a bitstream generated by 1000 coin flips and
the results follow.
As expected, the training lines hums right along around 50%.
This is in keeping with the fact that even a neural net can't make
progress on a truly random process. However, what is noteworthy is
that the training line does seem to show a continual improvement.








important except that it gives a secondary feature of the
fingerprint, which is similar to the linear congruential generator
discussed earlier.
CONCLUSION
As bitstream generators become more sophisticated and schemes
involving non-linear and chaotic processes become commonplace the
traditional linear methods of attack will prove to be inadequate.
Our proposal of using a neural net addresses this by utilizing it's
inherent nonlinear workings to attack this nonlinear problem: We
are fighting fire with fire. The graphs clearly indicate the value
of this method for finding the generator. We mention that many
standard attacks are of the "known generator" variety, and in this
sense the neural net fills in a crucial gap between theory and
practice by determining that generator. We have intentionally used
the net in an unsophisticated manner, without varying the net
parameters, in order to demonstrate the viability of this approach
in general. The development of a library of fingerprints of known
generators and of adapted artificial neural networks to identify
them would certainly appear to be a worthwhile undertaking for the
cryptanalyst.
Beyond the idea of generator characterization considered in
this paper, and as evidenced by the testing results from the Henon
scheme, we further believe that this method will be effective in
the actual prediction of bitstreams given some number of bits known
to be correct. To achieve this, future work will have to include
adaptive setting of the neural net software as well as the
investigation of different types of neural nets. However, at the
very least, we are absolutely convinced that neural nets can play
a significant, and perhaps dominant, role in the process of
attacking procedures that depend on pseudorandom bitstreams for
their security.
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